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The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential legal issues in establishing liability 
for large-scale emitters of greenhouse gases, in Australia, for resulting harms caused 
from changes to the climate system.  This paper assesses the legal principles and policy 
issues associated with potential negligence claims against industrial emitters in 
Australia such as large coal mines and coal-fired electricity plants.  This paper 
identifies a range of significant obstacles in successfully bringing claims in negligence 
for climatic harms.  These include issues in foreseeability, causation and the operation 
of public policy principles.  It is concluded that the distribution of risk from climate 
change, and associated allocation of liability, is more appropriately addressed through 
consistent, national legislation rather than through the ad hoc adaptation of the 
common law.   
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans play a pivotal role in contributing to climate change through the burning of 
fossil fuels, the use of products that emit greenhouse gases and land-use changes such as 
urbanisation, deforestation and agricultural practices.  Changes to our climate system 
are predicted to result in rising sea levels, rising temperature and higher incidences of 
severe storms.1  Climate-related harm could include loss of homes, livestock and other 
property, damage to public infrastructure and to coastal settlements, impaired 
                                                 
*  BSc (Env) LLB (Hons) (Griffith), Solicitor, Queensland, PhD Candidate School of Law/Institute for 
Sustainable Resources, QUT. Nicola’s current research project relates to the operation of the 
international climate change framework and its implementation in the Australian domestic arenas. 
Many thanks to Amanda Stickley, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, QUT for her invaluable advice 
regarding an early draft of this paper. 
1  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis: Summary for Policy Makers, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' (IPCC Secretariat Geneva, 2007); IPCC, 
'Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change' (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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agricultural yields, loss of livelihoods and population displacement.2  The human health 
impacts could involve thermal stress and heat-related deaths and illnesses, proliferation 
and geographical shifts of infectious diseases, impaired nutrition and other adverse 
mental and physical health risks.   
 
Despite this growing evidence, many authorities and industries in Australia appear 
reluctant to undertake immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.3  
Accordingly, some climate-related harm is now inevitable.  This leads to the question, 
on whom should the risk fall for climate harm?  Is it the industry, the government or the 
private individual?4
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential legal issues in establishing liability 
for large-scale emitters of greenhouse gases, in Australia, for resulting harms caused 
from changes to the climate system.  This paper focuses on the likely role of the 
common law of torts in addressing resulting harms from climate change in Australia.  It 
does so through an analysis of the potential scope of liability, and defences, for 
hypothetical negligence suits against coal mining projects and coal-fired power plants.5  
This paper identifies a range of significant obstacles in successfully bringing claims in 
negligence for climatic harms.  These include issues in foreseeability, causation and the 
operation of public policy principles.  Accordingly, this paper concludes that the 
prospects of success of such tortious actions are remote.  It is submitted that the 
distribution of risk from climate change, and associated allocation of liability, would be 
more appropriately addressed through consistent, national legislation rather than 
through the ad hoc adaptation of the common law.   
 
II THE RISK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF TORTS 
 
Climate Change is a global phenomenon and has resulted in international agreements to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and minimise climate harms.  A majority of the 
international community agreed to an international framework for reducing emissions 
through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
the Kyoto Protocol.6  The overriding objective of the UNFCCC, of which Australia is a 
party, is to achieve the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’.7
 
                                                 
2  Ibid. 
3  Some States are beginning to implement State-based reduction targets, but these do not yet amount to 
a prohibition on greenhouse gas emissions.  For example, the Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Act 2007 (SA). 
4  Or in the words of Myles Allen: ‘what might happen if it all goes horribly wrong?’  Myles Allen, 
'The Spectre of Liability: Part 1-Attribution' in Kenny Tang (ed), The Finance of Climate Change: A 
Guide for Governments, Corporations and Investors (2005) 367, 367. 
5  Potential tortious actions in nuisance, and negligence actions for other climate-related losses relating 
to statutory functions and professional advice, will be the subject of future papers. 
6  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 
ILM 849 (entered into force on 21 March 1994).  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 
on 16 February 2005).   
7  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 
ILM 849, art 2 (entered into force on 21 March 1994). 
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Australia is also a party to the Kyoto Protocol.  The newly elected government recently 
deposited the instrument of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with the United Nations 
Climate Change Secretariat.  Following formal ratification, Australia will be bound to 
comply with the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol.8  This includes an obligation to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 108 per cent of 1990 levels from 2008-2012.9
 
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are silent on the allocation of responsibility 
for damage caused as a result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  This means 
that, at an international level, reparation of harm must be addressed through existing 
international law principles including the principle of State responsibility for 
transboundary harm.10  At a national level, and in the absence of specific legislation 
regulating emissions and climate harm, the allocation of liability for losses must fall to 
be addressed by the common law.  
 
The common law is a dynamic area of law that is able to adapt to the changing needs of 
society.11  The principal goal of tort law has been described in many formats.  One 
theoretical approach refers to tort law as corrective justice, another as maximising social 
welfare and a third as the distribution or allocation of the costs of risk-bearing.12  From 
these three, the appropriate basis for liability for environment related torts appears to be 
based on considerations of sharing the risk of the broad social costs of climate change.13  
 
Accordingly, in the emerging area of climate losses, the Courts must develop and adapt 
legal principles to identify wrongdoers, recognise the wrong done, allocate blame and 
distribute losses.  However, it is debatable whether the common law of torts is able to 
adapt sufficiently to apply to the modern, global, environmental, problem of climate 
change which cuts across the public and private arenas.14  
 
III THE HYPOTHETICAL CLIMATE SUIT 
 
Tortious actions in negligence are most likely to be brought against large users of fossil 
fuels, suppliers of fossil fuels and the creators of products that utilise fossil fuels.15  
Actions may also be brought against governments, in their capacity as public authorities 
and where they own or control public works and infrastructure such as electricity 
utilities.  
 
This paper focuses on a hypothetical scenario involving the long-term operation of a 
coal mine, coal-fired electricity plant or other large-scale industrial emitter of 
                                                 
8  That is 90 days from the receipt of the Instrument of Ratification by the United Nations. 
9  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22, art 3 and Annex A (entered into force on 16 February 2005).   
10  See R Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State 
Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 54, 2005).  
11  Karen Morrow, 'Nuisance and Environmental Protection' in John Lowry and Rod Edmunds (eds), 
Environmental Protection and the Common Law (2000) 139, 139.  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 
CLR 180, [92] (McHugh J). 
12  G Williams and B A Hepple, Foundations of the Law of Tort (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1984) 197, 201. 
13  Morrow, above n 11, 157. 
14  Ibid. 
15  J Smith and D Shearman, Climate Change Litigation: Analysing the Law, Scientific Evidence and 
Impacts on the Environment, Health and Property (Presidian Legal Publications, 2006) 17. 
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greenhouse gases in Australia.  Such entities could be either publicly or privately 
owned.  Accordingly, it is against this factual background that the following tortious 
principles are considered: 
 
• the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; 
• a breach by the defendant of the standard of care; and 
• damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach of the duty. 
 
IV DUTY OF CARE OF EMITTERS OF GREENHOUSE GASES 
 
A Duty of Care and Physical Harm 
 
The type of harm suffered has implications for the finding that a duty of care is owed.  
Potential climate related harm, following greenhouse gas emissions, includes physical 
property damage from heat, wind, floods and sea level rises.   
 
Where greenhouse gas emissions have caused property damage, personal injury and 
consequential loss then it is necessary to determine whether the relationship between the 
parties falls within one of the recognised relationships giving rise to a duty of care.16   
 
The foundation for the establishment of a duty of care is found in the so-called 
‘neighbour principle’ as espoused in Donoghue v Stevenson:17
  
you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law is my neighbour? The 
answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I 
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called into question. 
 
The establishment of a neighbour relationship between the emitter and the plaintiff 
requires a number of elements including that the plaintiff be ‘so closely and directly 
affected’ that the emitter ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so 
affected.  Proximity was explained by Deane J in the following manner: 
 
[proximity] involves the notion of nearness or closeness and embraces physical proximity 
(in the sense of space and time) between the person or property of the plaintiff and the 
person or property of the defendant, circumstantial proximity such as an overriding 
relationship of employer and employee or of a professional man and his client and causal 
proximity in the sense of the closeness or directness of the relationship between the 
particular act or cause of action and the injury sustained.18
 
The application of this principle to an industrial plant and local residents affected by 
emissions appears quite valid.  However, the impacts of climate change go beyond the 
local community and extend to the regional, national and the global.  As the nexus 
between the emitter and the plaintiff expands, the likelihood of the Court finding a duty 
of care becomes more and more uncertain. 
                                                 
16  Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co [1973] 1 QB 27. 
17  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
18  Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, 584.  
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B Duty of Care and Pure Economic Loss 
 
In addition, where harms relating to climate change involve only a risk of physical 
damage, or property devaluation, then no physical harm will be involved and this will 
be pure economic loss.  This could occur in circumstances of negligent 
misrepresentation of the risks of property flooding, negligent performance of services in 
omitting to address climate risks, defective goods and property damage.  
 
Where the harm caused by the emitting industry results in pure economic loss then 
recovery will be permitted only in limited circumstances:19  
 
In my opinion it is still right to say that as a general rule damages are not recoverable for 
economic loss which is not consequential upon injury to the plaintiff's person or property. 
The fact that the loss was foreseeable is not enough to make it recoverable. However, 
there are exceptional cases in which the defendant has knowledge or means of knowledge 
that the plaintiff individually, and not merely as a member of an unascertained class, will 
be likely to suffer economic loss as a consequence of his negligence, and owes the 
plaintiff a duty to take care not to cause him such damage by his negligent act.20
 
This will require the establishment of a novel duty of care by the Court.  The Court now 
applies an incremental approach to the establishment of a novel duty of care, that is, 
‘the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy 
with the established categories’.21  This multi-factorial approach looks to a range of 
legal and policy principles including the defendant’s control of the circumstances giving 
rise to the harm and the vulnerability of the plaintiff in terms of their inability to protect 
themselves from that harm.22   
 
The concept of vulnerability was discussed in Woolcock Street Investments v CDG 
Property Ltd as: 
 
“vulnerability”, in this context, is not to be understood as meaning only that the plaintiff 
was likely to suffer damage if reasonable care was not taken. Rather, “vulnerability” is to 
be understood as a reference to the plaintiff’s inability to protect itself from the 
consequences of a defendant’s want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way 
which would cast the consequences of loss on the defendant.23
 
With respect to greenhouse gas emissions, the emitter has control of the nature and 
amount of greenhouse gases produced and emitted by its industrial activities.  The 
avoidance of harm from climate change is outside the control of the plaintiff and, as 
individuals, they are unable to prevent the occurrence of climate change.24  Moreover, 
                                                 
19  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
20  Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529, 555.
21  Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 481 (Brennan J). 
22  Sullivan v Moody (2001) 183 ALR 404, [48]-[9]; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; Bryan v 
Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Woolcock Street Investments 
Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; Esanda Finance Corporation v Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241. See, also, J Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort 
Law: Protection of the Vulnerable’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 41. 
23  Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515, [23] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
24  Ibid. 
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as severe weather events, coastal erosion, landslides and floods increase in vulnerable 
areas the insurance sector is increasingly denying coverage for these climate change 
related risks.25
 
However, in considering whether to establish a novel duty, the Court will also take into 
account public policy principles.  Public policy issues present a significant obstacle for 
any tortious action based on harm from climate change.  Climate change is a global 
phenomenon and occurs as a result of natural processes as well as historic and 
continuing anthropogenic emissions.  The establishment of a duty of care for harm 
caused by climate change as a result of the contribution of the particular emissions of 
the defendant could be regarded as the imposition of an unreasonable social burden.  
The Court may determine that holding these individual emitters responsible for the 
cumulative global and historic emissions of our industrialised society is an unreasonable 
shift of responsibility and has the potential to result in the imposition of indeterminate 
liability on emitters.26  As part of its considerations, the Court will balance the interests 
of the community with concerns that the identification of a duty of care could result in a 
flood of claims before the Courts alleging breach.  As the harms from climate change 
become more and more apparent in Australia, concerns about the flood of claims 
become all the more legitimate in the eyes of the law. 
 
C Duty of Care and Public Authorities 
 
Claims may potentially be bought against public authorities in circumstances where 
they own or control the emitting plants such as electricity producers.  
 
Section 35 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) states the following principles will 
apply in determining whether a duty of care exists in relation to a public authority: 
 
(a) the functions required to be exercised by the authority are limited by the financial and 
other resources that are reasonably available to the authority for the purpose of exercising 
the functions; 
(b) the general allocation of financial or other resources by the authority is not open to 
challenge; 
(c) the functions required to be exercised by the authority are to be decided by reference 
to the broad range of its activities (and not merely by reference to the matter to which the 
proceeding relates); 
(d) the authority may rely on evidence of its compliance with its general procedures and 
any applicable standards for the exercise of its functions as evidence of the proper 
exercise of its functions in the matter to which the proceeding relates.27
  
                                                 
25  Andrew Dlugolecki and Mojdeh Keykhah, 'Climate Change and the Insurance Sector: Its Role in 
Adaptation and Mitigation' in Kathryn Begg, Frans Van Der Woerd and David L Levy (eds), The 
Business of Climate Change: Corporate Responses to Kyoto (2005) 147; RF&C Investments, 'In the 
Front Line: The Insurance Industry's Response to Climate Change' (Reo Research, 2007) 8; Evan 
Mills, 'From Risk to Opportunity: 2007, Insurer Responses to Climate Change' (CERES, 2007). 
26  Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 52.  
27  Similar provisions have been adopted in s 42 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); s 38 of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s 110 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); and s 5W of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA).  Section 83 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) is similar but excludes (b).  R 
Douglas, G Mullins and S Grant, The Annotated Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2004) 35.5. 
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Accordingly, public authorities are able to rely on evidence of limited financial and 
other resources in defending findings of a duty, or breach of that duty, by the Court.  
The onerous financial burden of accounting for climate change will heavily influence 
the consideration of reasonableness, by the Court, when considering the existence of a 
duty of care regarding global impacts from climate change.  
 
V BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CARE AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
 
A Standard of Care and Emissions 
 
Once a duty of care has been found to have been owed, the Court must consider what is 
the relevant standard of care and if it has been breached.  The standard of care is 
determined, as a question of law, through the application of an objective standard of the 
‘reasonable person’.28  This was described by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v 
Shirt:29
 
in deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must 
first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen 
that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including 
the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to 
determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The 
perception of the reasonable man's response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of 
the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, 
difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting 
responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced 
out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be 
ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant's position.30 (emphasis added) 
 
Accordingly, in setting the appropriate standard of care the Court will determine the 
magnitude of the risk of climate change, the probability of that risk actually occurring 
and the relative expense of requiring the defendant to take steps to alleviate that risk.
 
B Calculus of Breach of Duty and Climate Harm 
 
The relevance of the ability to take precautions against a risk of harm is now articulated 
in section 9 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) as: 
 
(1) A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a risk of harm unless— 
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought 
reasonably to have known); and 
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and 
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have 
taken the precautions.31
 
                                                 
28  Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 454. 
29  Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
30  Ibid 47-8 ( Mason J). 
31  Similar provisions to s 9 have been enacted in s 43 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); s 5B Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW); s 32 Civil Liability Act 2002 (SA); s 11 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s 
48 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); s 5B Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).  Douglas, Mullins and Grant, above 
n 27, 9.7. 
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Foreseeability of the risk has been described by the Court as ‘a risk of injury which is 
remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a 
foreseeable risk.  A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore 
foreseeable’.32   
 
Under the tort law reforms, this common law test of foreseeability has been altered to 
apply to risks that are ‘not insignificant’.33  This was discussed in Drinkwater v 
Howarth,34 as ‘a risk which is much more than far-fetched or fanciful may not differ 
materially from a risk which is not insignificant…if the plaintiff was clearly at risk, then 
it cannot be said that the risk was insignificant.  It was a clear risk’.35  
 
So the question is, was the risk of climate change ‘not insignificant’ at the time of the 
emission of the greenhouse gases?  
 
The UNFCCC, of which Australia is a party, was adopted in 1992.36  The preambles to 
the UNFCCC clearly state that the parties to the UNFCCC are concerned about the 
impact of increased emissions on global warming and climate change: 
 
concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse 
effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface 
and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.37
 
On the basis of this international agreement, it could be legitimately argued that the risk 
of injury from climate change resulting from human emissions of greenhouse gases was 
a real, foreseeable risk and ‘not insignificant’ risk as of 1992.  In contrast, it was not 
until 2007 that the Australian Federal government officially acknowledged that the 
science linking greenhouse gas emissions and global warming was convincing ‘over 
time, the scientific evidence that the climate is warming has become quite compelling 
and the link between emissions of greenhouse gases from human activity and higher 
temperatures is also convincing’.38   
 
In any event, the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in February 2007, made it abundantly 
clear that climate change was occurring, that the effects of climate change were of an 
adverse or harmful nature and that greenhouse gas emissions were contributors to that 
occurrence.39
 
                                                 
32  Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 48 (Mason J). 
33  Cf s 48(3)(a) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), which states that this term includes, but is not limited to, 
acts that are far-fetched or fanciful. 
34  Drinkwater v Howarth [2006] NSWCA 222. 
35  Ibid [16] and [19]. 
36  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 31 
ILM 849 (entered into force on 21 March 1994).  This was signed by Australia on 4 June 1992 and 
ratified on 30 December 1992. 
37  Ibid Preamble. 
38  Prime Minister John Howard, Address to the Melbourne Press Club (2007) eGov monitor 
<http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/13024> at 8 January 2008. 
39  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2007', above n 1. 
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In relation to climate warming, the IPCC Report concludes that ‘warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising 
global mean sea level’.40
 
The IPCC Report identifies a clear link between temperature increases and greenhouse 
gas emissions and concludes that ‘most of the observed increase in globally average 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’.41
 
The assessment concludes that continued emissions at or above current rates will, very 
likely, cause further warming and induce larger changes in the climate system than 
those observed during the 20th century.42  
 
Accordingly, at the time of release of this report with its increased scientific certainty, 
knowledge of the probability of harm from unabated greenhouse gas emissions could be 
concluded to have entered the public arena.   
 
An analogy may be drawn with medical negligence cases where knowledge of the risk 
of harm has developed over time.  In H v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children,43 
there was no general knowledge of the risk of contracting HIV via blood transfusions 
until the first documented case in 1983.  Justice Badgery-Parker found that, upon 
publication of the reported case, the hospital ought to have been aware of the risk ‘the 
first Australian case of AIDS was published in April 1983.  I have no difficulty in 
concluding that reasonably informed physicians, scientists and blood transfusion 
services in this country ought to have been well aware by at latest April 1983 that there 
was a real risk’.44
 
A similar argument could be run in relation to the release of the IPCC report in 
February 2007.  
 
The IPCC assessment reports address climate change impacts predominantly at a global 
level.  It could be argued that the specific harm experienced by the plaintiff was not 
itself reasonably foreseeable because those localised impacts were not predicted by the 
IPCC.  However, this argument becomes weaker as Australian studies on likely climatic 
impacts, at a regional level, become publicly available.45  
 
Additionally, the argument could be raised by defendants that, because of the global, 
cumulative relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, the 
                                                 
40  Ibid 4. 
41  Ibid 8.  ‘Very likely’, in this quote, refers to a scientific certainty of above 90%. 
42  Ibid 10. 
43  H v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-000. 
44  Ibid 529. 
45  For example, CSIRO and Australia Bureau of Meteorology, 'Climate Change in Australia: Technical 
Report 2007' (CSIRO, 2007); RSJ (Bob) Beeton et al, Australia State of the Environment 2006: 
Independent Report to the Australian Government Minister for the Environment and Heritage, 
Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra (2006) Australian Government, Department 
of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/index.html> at 8 January 2008. 
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harm would have occurred regardless of the care taken by the defendant.  The IPCC 
Report concludes that past and future emissions will continue to contribute to warming 
and sea level rises for more than a millennium to come due to the large timescales 
required to remove the gases from the atmosphere.46  Carbon dioxide, for example, will 
stay in the atmosphere for up to 100 years.47  
 
In determining whether there has been a breach of duty, the Court will undertake an 
assessment of, amongst other matters, the reasonableness of the precautions undertaken 
by the defendant.  The matters to be considered are articulated in section 9(2) of the 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) as: 
 
In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of 
harm, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things)— 
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken; 
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm; 
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; 
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. 
 
The level of probability of the harm occurring will vary according to the nature of the 
plaintiff and the point in time of the assessment.  The probability and likely seriousness 
of the risk of harm will be assessed at the time of injury to the plaintiff.48  In terms of 
the seriousness of the harm, the Court will take into account the gravity of the harm in 
terms of the global impacts from greenhouse gas emissions and predicted changes to the 
climate system.  
 
In terms of the burden of taking practical precautions with respect to the nature of the 
risk, this is detailed in section 10 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld): 
 
(a) the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm includes the burden of taking 
precautions to avoid similar risks of harm for which the person may be responsible; and 
(b) the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing something in a different 
way does not of itself give rise to or affect liability for the way in which the thing was 
done.49
 
The Court will assess the reasonableness of the acts taken by the defendant.  In Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,50 the distributor of oysters was sued in negligence after 
the plaintiff contracted hepatitis from oysters which had been grown in contaminated 
water.  Justice McHugh considered the reasonableness of the acts of the defendant and 
commented: 
 
no doubt the magnitude of the risk, if it eventuated, was high. But so are the magnitudes 
of many risks that reasonable people run because the alternative is too costly or too 
inconvenient. The magnitude of the risk of being involved in a motor car accident is very 
high, and the risk could be minimised, if not eliminated, by no car ever travelling at more 
                                                 
46  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2007', above n 1, 13.  
47  The other greenhouse gases have both longer and shorter life spans. 
48  Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 QB 66. 
49  Similar provisions have been enacted in: s 44 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); s 5C Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW); ss 11 and 12 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s 49 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); s 
5B(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).  Douglas, Mullins and Grant, above n 27, 10.3. 
50  Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, [111]. 
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than 10 km per hour. But few would contend that travelling at 10 km per hour was the 
only reasonable response to the risk of a motor car accident.51  
 
A similar analysis could be applied in relation to the magnitude of risk of climate 
change and the reasonableness of requiring industries to avoid all (or most) greenhouse 
gas emissions.  A balance needs to be identified between the risk and the reasonable 
steps that could be taken to minimise emissions.  This could include use of ‘clean coal’ 
technologies or carbon capture and storage (CCS), the generation or purchase of offset 
credits through sequestration and renewable energy projects or modification to plants to 
utilise alternative fuel sources.52   
 
The Court will look to the expense, difficulty and convenience of the taking of those 
practical precautions in the context of the gravity of the harm.53  The fact that the 
defendant does not possess the resources to implement the reasonable precautions is not 
itself a sufficient defence.54  The Court could take into account the ability of the 
defendant to pass the costs of these initiatives on to consumers and the ultimate cost 
implications for the community.  The Court will also consider the social utility of the 
activity giving rise to the harm.55  In a modern context, it would be possible to raise the 
argument that there is an essential community need for continued energy supply in 
order for our society to function.   
 
 In considering whether there has been a breach of duty, the Court will take into account 
any relevant statutory or customary standards.  Whether there is statutory authorisation 
for the harmful act will be a relevant factor.  For example, if legislation prescribed the 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions that may lawfully be emitted into the atmosphere 
then this would be factored into the consideration of the reasonableness of the conduct.  
It is possible that the future Federal emissions trading system would encompass such an 
authorisation.  Current environmental protection legislation in Australia regulates 
‘environmental harm’ and ‘pollution’ in such terms that could reasonably be applied to 
restrict greenhouse gas emissions.56  However, environmental protection authorities are 
not currently enforcing those provisions in relation to greenhouse gases and, as a 
general rule, those authorisations do not prohibit or restrict greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
 Customary standards will also be a relevant consideration for the Court.  Industries 
worldwide have historically emitted unabated greenhouse gases since the time of the 
industrial revolution.  Customarily, there have been no limits or restrictions on those 
emissions from industrial activities.  However, this is but one factor for the Court to 
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52  See N Durrant, ‘Emissions Trading, Offsets and Other Mitigation Options for the Australian Coal 
Industry’ (2007) 24(5) Environmental Planning and Law Journal 361. 
53  Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) 
(1998) 192 CLR 431; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
54  PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19; Apex Holiday Centre (Inc) v Lynn [2005] 
WASCA 58.
55  This has traditionally been applied in cases involving the police, ambulance and other social services 
in terms of the community good.  For example, Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All 
ER 333; Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 2 All ER 368. 
56  See D E Fisher, 'The Statutory Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Environmental 
Regulation' (2007) 24(3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 210.  
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take into consideration and will not necessarily operate to prevent a finding of breach of 
duty.   
 
VI BREACH OF DUTY AND DAMAGE IN CLIMATE SUITS 
 
In deciding whether a breach of duty caused the particular damage the Court will 
consider: 
 
• whether the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(factual causation); 
• whether it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in breach to 
extend to the harm (scope of liability).57  
 
A Establishing Factual Causation in Climate Suits 
 
Attribution of responsibility under the law of torts is based on causation as a limiting 
force.58  To be liable in negligence there must be a causal connection between the 
defendant’s breach of duty and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.59  However, climate 
change represents a unique challenge for the establishment of causation and it is unlike 
any other form of environmental pollution or toxic tort.60  
 
1 Causation and the Climate System 
 
The Earth’s climate system is described by the IPCC as follows: 
 
an interactive system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the 
hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the land surface and the biosphere, forced or influenced by 
various external forcing mechanisms, the most important of which is the Sun…the direct 
effect of human activities on the climate system is [also] considered an external 
forcing…Many physical, chemical and biological interaction processes occur among the 
various components of the climate system on a wide range of space and time scales, 
making the system extremely complex.61
 
The IPCC was established in 1988 to assess existing scientific information in order to 
understand the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change and its potential 
impacts.62  The reports of the IPCC predict that the effects of climate change will 
include increases in temperature, sea-level rises, precipitation changes and increased 
incidences of droughts, floods and other extreme weather events.63  
 
                                                 
57  Section 9 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
58  Robert G Lee, 'From the Individual to the Environmental: Tort Law in Turbulence' in John Lowry 
and Rod Edmunds (eds), Environmental Protection and the Common Law (2000) 77, 78. 
59  Section 11(1)(a) Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).  
60  For example, emissions from the exhausts of cars and deterioration in air quality have a clear 
temporal and spatial link.  There are analogies to be drawn between causation issues in climate 
litigation and those already experienced in tobacco and toxic tort suits. However, the evidentiary 
links in climate litigation are significantly more complex.  Lee, above n 58, 81. 
61  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2001', above n 1, 1.1.2. 
62  IPCC < http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm> at 8 January 2008. 
63  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2007', above n 1. 
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The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report identifies a clear link between temperature 
increases and greenhouse gas emissions and concludes that ‘most of the observed 
increase in globally average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to 
the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’.64
 
The Courts have traditionally applied the common sense and experience test 
encompassing the ‘but for’ test.65  That is, whether the plaintiff’s damage would have 
occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s act or omissions in combination with value judgments 
of the Court and the infusion of policy considerations.66  This civil standard of proof 
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s 
acts or omissions caused the damage suffered.67  There must be a ‘more probable 
inference in favour of what is alleged’ not just a possibility.68  
 
The action will fail if non-negligent causes of the harm are equally probable on the 
facts.69  In the case of Barnett v Chelsea,70 the plaintiff alleged negligence in the 
hospital care of her husband after he had consumed arsenic tea.  The plaintiff failed to 
establish a causal link between the breach of the duty of care and her husband’s death as 
the Court found that her husband would have died regardless of the care he received.71
 
A simple cause and effect approach is problematic in the case of harm from climate 
change as expressed by the IPCC: 
 
many processes and interactions in the climate system are non-linear. That means that 
there is no simple proportional relation between cause and effect. A complex, non-linear 
system may display what is technically called chaotic behaviour. This means that the 
behaviour of the system is critically dependent on very small changes of the initial 
conditions. This does not imply, however, that the behaviour of non-linear chaotic 
systems is entirely unpredictable.72
 
Accordingly, it is inevitable that some level of scientific uncertainty will prevail.73  As 
commented by Brown: 
 
even if predictions about future temperature increase could be made with acceptable 
levels of certainty, predicting the consequences of specific temperature increase on 
ecological systems requires confrontation with many additional issues that are plagued by 
                                                 
64  Ibid 8.  Very likely, in this context, refers to above 99% scientific certainty. 
65  This is reflected in s 11(1)(b) and s 11(4) of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
66  March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, 516 (Mason CJ). 
67  Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
68  TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345, 349 (Gibbs J); Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness 
(2000) 49 NSWLR 262, 275 (Spigelman J); St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106, 107. 
69  Chisholm v State Transport Authority (1987) 46 SASR 148; Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v 
Fernandez (1976) 50 ALJR 720, 724 (Mason J). 
70  Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
71  Ibid. 
72  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2001', above n 1, 1.2.2. 
73  J Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-Making and Scientific 
Uncertainty (The Federation Press, 2005) 36. 
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scientific uncertainty. The science of ecology is much too soft to predict ecosystem-wide 
responses to stress with certainty.74
 
The IPCC is regarded as an example of the emergence of ‘post-normal science’, that is, 
a scientific approach with relaxed scientific thresholds which embodies the 
precautionary principle and utilises an extended peer community.75  Accordingly, this 
adoption of a post-normal approach to scientific assessment has repercussions for the 
ability of plaintiffs to establish a persuasive causative link.  There is, of course, no strict 
requirement to meet the scientific standard of proof in the establishment of judicial 
causation.76  In the determination of causation, the Court will adopt a common sense 
approach.77  Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify, on the balance of probabilities, that 
the greenhouse gas emissions of the defendant caused the harm suffered in the presence 
of such scientific doubt.  As concluded by Allen ‘for the vast majority of damaging 
weather events, we will never be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that “but for” 
human influence on climate, that event would never have occurred’.78
 
Climate change is a global phenomenon and is the result of historic emissions from 
human society.  Current greenhouse gas emissions will contribute to the overall 
cumulative atmospheric concentrations.  It will therefore be problematic to prove that a 
particular defendant was responsible for the actual emissions which caused climate 
change and the local environmental effects, which in turn caused the particular harm to 
the plaintiff.79  Accordingly, the spatial and temporal scales between the release of 
emissions, the resulting climate changes and the resulting harm or loss are inherently 
unpredictable.  As explained by the IPCC: 
 
when variations in the external forcing occur, the response time of the various 
components of the climate system is very different. With regard to the atmosphere, the 
response time of the troposphere is relatively short, from days to weeks, whereas the 
stratosphere comes into equilibrium on a time-scale of typically a few months. Due to 
their large heat capacity, the oceans have a much longer response time, typically decades 
but up to centuries or millennia…Therefore the system may respond to variations in 
external forcing on a wide range of space- and time-scales.80
 
There is a complex series of processes, responses and feedbacks that occur in the 
climate system following the cumulative radiative forcing of the greenhouse gases.  In 
addition, some natural climate variability will continue to occur.  There will be 
                                                 
74  Donald A Brown, 'The Precautionary Principle as a Guide to Environmental Impact Analysis: 
Lessons Learned from Global Warming' in Joel A Tickner (ed), Precaution, Environmental Science, 
and Preventive Public Policy (2003) 141, 145. 
75  J Ravetz, 'The Post-Normal Science of Precaution' (2004) 36 Futures 347; T Saloranta, 'Post-Normal 
Science and the Global Climate Change Issue' (2001) 50 Climatic Change 395; S Funtowicz and J 
Ravetz, 'Science for the Post-Normal Age' (1993) 25 Futures 739. 
76  Although, probabilistic evidence has been adopted in some medical cases; see, R Goldberg, 
Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts: Scientific Evidence and Medicinal Product Liability (Hart 
Publishing, 1999) . 
77  Laferriere v Lawson [1991] 1 SCR 541, [159]; Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307, [176] 
(McClellan CJ).
78  Myles Allen, 'The Spectre of Liability: Part 2-Implications' in Kenny Tang (ed), The Finance of 
Climate Change: A Guide for Governments, Corporations and Investors (2005) 381, 381. 
79  See E Penalver, 'Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate 
Change' (1998) 38(Fall) Natural Resources Journal 563, 579-82. 
80  IPCC, 'Climate Change 2001', above n 1, 1.2.2. 
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difficulty in distinguishing between natural climate variability and human induced 
climatic changes.  Moreover, the argument may persist that due to the cumulative global 
nature of emissions the harm would have occurred regardless of the contributions of the 
defendant.  
 
2 Increase in the Risk of Harm from Climate Change 
 
In certain cases involving negligence and harm to health, the Court has moved away 
from the strict application of civil proof.  In an attempt to bridge the evidentiary gap 
from lack of knowledge the Courts have instead applied the test of whether, on the 
balance of probabilities, the defendant’s negligence materially contributed to the risk of 
the damage occurring.81
 
One of the primary decisions in this area is McGhee v National Coal Board.82  In that 
case, an employee was exposed to abrasive brick dust, no washing facilities were 
provided, and he developed dermatitis.  The Court held that the employer was liable in 
negligence where his breach of duty had caused, or materially contributed to, the injury 
suffered notwithstanding that there were other factors which had contributed to the 
injury: 
 
first, it is a sound principle that where a person has, by breach of a duty of care, created a 
risk, and injury occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless 
he shows that it had some other cause. Secondly…one may ask, why should a man who is 
able to show that his employer should have taken certain precautions…and who in fact 
sustains exactly that injury…have to assume the burden of proving more: namely, that it 
was the addition to the risk, caused by the breach of duty, which caused or materially 
contributed to the injury? In many cases…this is impossible to prove, just because honest 
medical opinion cannot segregate the causes of an illness between compound causes. And 
if one asks which of the parties…should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the 
answer as a matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the risk 
who…must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of damage, who should bear its 
consequences.83
 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 
Ltd,84 the House of Lords permitted the evidentiary gap to be overcome for an 
employee who suffered mesothelioma.  Mesothelioma and anthropogenic climate 
change can be characterised in similar terms as they are triggered by cumulative 
impacts. Mesothelioma has been described by one expert as ‘cumulative in that the 
longer the exposure and the heavier the exposure the greater the dose of asbestos which 
enters the lung and therefore the greater the chance of fibres getting into the periphery 
of the lung where they would generate mesothelioma’.85
 
                                                 
81  McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008; Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] 
AC 613; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32. 
82  McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008. 
83  Ibid 1012; McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, 6 (Lord Wilberforce); cf Wilsher v 
Essex Health Authority [1988] AC 1074.
84  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32.
85  Evidence of Dr Joseph in Scott (DDT 48/90) quoted in Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in liq) v 
Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355 (CA).
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Under the state of medical knowledge at the time, onset of the disease could not be 
attributed exclusively to one of several successive employers, all equally careless.  The 
Court in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd held that, in certain special 
circumstances, the Court could depart from the usual ‘but for’ test of causal connection 
and treat a lesser degree of causal connection as sufficient, namely that the defendant's 
breach of duty had materially contributed to causing the claimant's disease by materially 
increasing the risk of the disease being contracted.86
 
It might be possible for plaintiffs to bring sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 
large-scale fossil fuel user materially increased the risk of climatic impacts, with 
resulting harm, by their greenhouse gas contributions.  However, the Australian Courts 
are yet to embrace the United Kingdom approach to exceptional cases.   
 
In special cases in Australia it must be shown, as a minimum, that on the balance of 
probabilities the defendant materially contributed to the injury suffered.87  The 
distinction between increase in risk and material contribution was discussed in Seltsam 
Pty Ltd v McGuiness:88
 
the issue in the present case is whether an increased risk did cause or materially 
contribute to the injury actually suffered…There is a tension between the suggestion that 
any increased risk is sufficient to constitute a ‘material contribution’, and the clear line of 
authority that a mere possibility is not sufficient to establish causation for legal 
purposes…The reconciliation between the two kinds of reference is to be found in the 
fact that…the actual risk had materialised. The ‘possibility’ or ‘risk’ that X might cause Y 
had in fact eventuated, not in the sense that X happed and Y also happed, but that it was 
undisputed that Y had happened because of X.89 (emphasis added) 
 
Assuming that the traditional standard of proof would apply to climate torts in 
Australia, the establishment of a causative link between the harm suffered and the 
identifiable increased risk by the defendant will be highly problematic.  Grossman notes 
that these difficulties in establishing causation may be lessened where the plaintiff is the 
government: 
  
when states bring tort claims, the plaintiffs have almost infinite lifespans and cover large 
amounts of territory, allowing for an aggregation of effects over both space and 
time…The aggregation of harms makes it easier to rule out confounding 
factors…aggregation allows plaintiffs to better establish that some present harms from 
climate change exist in the broader geographic and temporal range.90
 
                                                 
86  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32.  This test will not apply where there are 
any number of noxious agents which may equally probably have caused the harm or damage; 
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
[2003] 1 AC 32, [22] (Lord Bingham).
87  Orica Limited and Anor v CGU Insurance Limited [2003] NSWCA 331, [90] (Spigelman CJ); 
Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307, 312–20 (Mason P); Wallaby Grip (BAE) 
Pty Ltd (in liq) v Macleay Area Health Service (1998) 17 NSWCCR 355 (CA).
88  Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262. 
89  Ibid 280 (Spigelman CJ). 
90  D A Grossman, 'Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation' 
(2003) 28 Colombia Journal of Environmental Law 1, 24-5. 
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Plaintiffs may also benefit from the use of class actions where there are a number of 
actions with common issues of law or fact.91  Although the joining of such actions 
would not lessen the burden of establishing causation, they could assist through the 
pooling of resources towards obtaining necessary scientific and factual evidence 
regarding the defendant’s contribution to the harm suffered.  Nevertheless, the 
probability of success of tortious actions for climate harm would be enhanced if 
Australian Courts were persuaded that climate change is an ‘exceptional circumstance’ 
meriting the relaxation of the strict ‘but for’ test and the adoption of the United 
Kingdom approach.  For this to occur, the Court must be persuaded that there are good 
public policy reasons for the extension of liability under a less stringent causative 
approach.92  In the absence of such judicial developments, the difficulties in 
establishing causation appear, at this point in time, insurmountable. 
 
3 Relevance of Environmental Principles 
 
It will be interesting to observe the judicial treatment of these unique claims in 
negligence as they emerge in Australia and, in particular, the potential role that 
established environmental law principles could play in traditional deliberations of 
causation.  This includes the application of the concept of ecological sustainable 
development and the embedded principle of inter-generational equity and precautionary 
principle.93
 
Ecologically sustainable development (ESD) is described as, ‘development which aims 
to meet the needs of Australians today, while conserving our ecosystems for the benefit 
of future generations’.94  And ‘using, conserving and enhancing the community's 
resources so that ecological processes, on which life depends, are maintained, and the 
total quality of life, now and in the future, can be increased’.95
 
The precautionary principle asserts that a lack of scientific certainty should not be used 
as a reason for not taking action to protect the environment.96  This principle is designed 
to alleviate the acknowledged difficulties of obtaining full scientific certainty.  The 
effect of this statutory principle is, inter alia, to lower the threshold at which decision-
makers must acknowledge that a reasonable risk to the environment exists.97  
Accordingly, the precautionary principle has the potential to play a significant role in 
the adaptation of common law principles to these emergent environmental harms.   
 
                                                 
91  See D Grave and K Adams, Class Actions in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2005); and John Taberner, 
Class Actions and Climate Change (2007) Freehills 
<www.freehills.com.au/publications/publications_6950.asp> at 8 January 2008. 
92  Section 11(2) Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).  Similar provisions have been enacted in s 45 Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); s 5D Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); s 13 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); 
s 51 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); s 5C Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); s 34(2) Wrongs Act 1936 (SA). 
93  See Ecologically Sustainable Development Steering Committee, Australian Government, National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992) Part 1; Australian Government, 
'Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment' (1992). 
94  Ecologically Sustainable Development Steering Committee, above n 93. 
95  Ibid. 
96  David Freestone and Ellen Hey, 'Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle' in David 
Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and International Law (1996) 3, 13. 
97  N De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 160. 
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The interaction of the precautionary principle with the common law standard of proof 
could operate to lower the threshold at which a risk of harm from greenhouse gas 
emissions becomes ‘probable’.98  However, until such time as the Court considers this 
issue, the interaction of these principles is largely conjecture.  Moreover, even as the 
threshold for establishing a causative link decreases, the risk of the Court imposing 
indeterminate liability increases.99  This policy issue may operate to persuade the Court 
that it is not appropriate to impose indeterminate private liability for these forms of 
global public harm.   
 
B Scope of Liability 
 
As part of its deliberations, the Court must also consider whether it is appropriate for 
the scope of the liability of the person in breach to extend to the harm caused.100  This 
will include a consideration of intervening causes and public policy issues.  
 
1 Intervening Causes 
 
The Court must consider whether other causes have intervened to break the chain of 
causation; ‘man must guard against normal phenomenon of nature not against unusual 
ones’.101  
 
Defendants might raise the argument that climate change, and the resulting impacts, are 
‘out of the ordinary’ and that all ordinary precautions have been taken against 
foreseeable harm.  Alternatively, it could be submitted that more recent greenhouse gas 
emissions from other entities, following the emissions of the defendant, acted as novus 
actus interveniens.102  In the context of significant emissions worldwide it might be 
argued that those other emissions were intervening events, breaking the chain of 
causation and that those emitters were in fact ‘the last wrongdoers’.103  The success of 
such arguments would depend upon the prevailing judicial attitude to the establishment 
of causation. 
 
2 Policy Considerations 
 
This paper has identified a number of potential policy issues that could operate to 
persuade the Court to not identify a duty of care.  These policy considerations will also 
play an important role in the Court’s decision as to whether the scope of liability for 
breach of that duty is appropriate.104  These include considerations of the fairness of 
imposing the burden of liability relative to the fault of the defendant as well as: 
 
 
 
                                                 
98  Peel, above n 73, 155. 
99  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 221 (McHugh J). 
100  Section 11(1)(b) Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
101  Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch; J Fleming, The Law of Torts (LBC Information 
Series, 9th ed, 1998) 249.  
102  Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 W Bl 892. 
103  Home Office v Dorset Yacht Company Ltd [1970] AC 1004.  
104  Considered in Anns v London Borough of Merton [1978] AC 728. 
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• the spectre of indeterminate liability;105 
• floodgates concerns;106 
• public/private issues: who can better avoid the loss and who should bear the risk for 
the public harm of climate change?  
• the availability (or lack of) alternative remedies under common law and statute; 
• the deliberate decision of legislature not to regulate or prohibit emissions.  The 
Court will assess the respective roles of the Court and the Parliament.107 
 
The combination of all of these policy considerations will weigh heavily in the Court’s 
determination of whether it is appropriate to impose liability on the defendant.  Overall, 
it is highly probable that the Court would conclude that it is not appropriate to impose 
liability for the emission of greenhouse gases and the resulting climate harm.  
 
VII POTENTIAL DEFENCES TO CLIMATE SUITS 
 
In defence of a tortious action, it could be argued that the plaintiff’s own negligence or 
fault contributed to the injury or loss suffered where that damage was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the of the plaintiff’s fault.108  The question to be asked is 
whether the plaintiff’s conduct increased the risk of harm?109  If found to have been 
contributory negligent, the Court will apportion liability and will reduce the award of 
damages based on the principle of what is just and equitable given the plaintiff’s degree 
of fault or share in responsibility for the damage.110  This could potentially result in a 
100 per cent reduction in damages.111
 
Accordingly, in climate suits it could be argued that the loss or harm of the plaintiff was 
caused partly by the fault of the plaintiff.  As noted by Grossman, we are all potentially 
responsible under tort law for our continued emissions of greenhouse gases.112  This 
could be based on the plaintiff’s own acts of emitting, or causing to be emitted, 
greenhouse gases through their consumption of goods and services thereby adding to 
the cumulative risk of adverse climate change.  This submission is less persuasive 
where the plaintiff can show that they have taken steps to minimise or offset their own 
emissions.113  
 
An alternative defence could be raised of volenti non fit injuria where the plaintiff can 
be shown to have freely accepted the risk of injury from climate change, through their 
consumption of goods and services, with the full knowledge of the risk that the emission 
                                                 
105  For example, Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ (1976) 136 CLR 529, 555. 
106  For example, Chester v Council of the Municipality of Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1. 
107  Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
108  Joslyn v Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552. 
109  Azzopardi v State Transport Authority (Rail Division) (1982) 30 SASR 434. 
110  Joslyn v Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552; Davies v Swan Motor Company (Swansea) Limited [1949] 
2 KB 291, 326 (Lord Denning); Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663, 682. 
111  Section 24 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). Similar provisions have been enacted in s 47 Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); s 5S Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); s 4(1) Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas); s 63 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). 
112  Grossman, above n 90, 25. 
113  It is envisaged that proportionate responsibility for emissions will be uneven with greater fault falling 
to the industrial source of emissions rather than the emissions of the individual plaintiff. 
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of greenhouse gases would result in climate change and harm.114  The evidence must 
support an inference that the plaintiff consented to the risk of injury, by the defendant, 
and to the lack of reasonable care which would create that risk of harm.115  This 
argument would be weakened where it can be demonstrated that there was no free 
choice in using those goods and services as there were no reasonably available, low-
emission, alternatives.116
 
Finally, time limitations in the bringing an action could pose significant difficulties for 
plaintiffs.117  In any action, the plaintiff must identify the point in time at which the 
cause of action accrued.  This is exacerbated in the climate scenario where it is 
impossible to identify the historical point in time at which the emission of greenhouse 
gases gave rise to the current harm suffered.  Given scientific uncertainty as to the 
timescale between the emission of greenhouse gases and resulting forcing effect in the 
climate system, it will be a challenge to identify the point in time at which the action 
accrued.  
 
VIII PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS OF CLIMATE ACTIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to consider the role of the common law action of 
negligence in addressing climate related harms from large-scale emitters in Australia.  
At this embryonic stage of climate change torts, both in Australian and overseas 
jurisdictions, it is largely a theoretical exercise in assessing the likely probabilities of 
success of tortious actions.  So much will be dependent upon the character of the 
defendant, the nature of the harm suffered and the specificity of the scientific evidence 
available.  Critically, it will also depend upon the judicial philosophy of the residing 
Court in terms of their commitment to developing the common law to remedy these new 
emerging climate injustices. 
 
This paper has identified a number of significant obstacles to the successful instigation 
of tortious actions in negligence for climate related harm including: foreseeability, 
causation and public policy considerations.  Without doubt, the establishment of 
causation remains the primary obstacle to any successful tortious action against any 
private or public defendant.  The level of scientific uncertainty is significant and the 
challenges of meeting the legal test of causation enormous.   
 
The likelihood of the Court indulging such tenuous claims of a causative link between 
the emissions and harm suffered is doubtful.  Moreover, the judiciary may well consider 
that it is not its proper role to establish such wide private liability for harm that is caused 
through the global, public, phenomenon of climate change.  Concerns about the 
imposition of indeterminate liability, floodgates concerns, and the proper role of the 
                                                 
114  Smith v Baker and Sons [1891] AC 325. 
115  Woodridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43, 69. 
116  Grossman, above n 90, 51.  As to the requirement to be able to choose freely see, Bowater v Rowley 
Regis Corporation [1944] KB 476, 479 (Lord Justice Scott).  
117  As a general rule, a limitation period of three years applies to personal injuries and a period of six 
years to property damage.  Sections 11, 10(1) Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld); ss 16B(2), 11(1) 
Limitation Act 1985 (ACT); ss 18A, 50C, 14(1)(b) Limitation Act 1969 (NSW); ss 36, 35 Limitation 
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422 
Vol 7 No 2 (QUTLJJ) Climate change, causation and 
public policy considerations 
legislature in ‘laying down the law’ may well operate to prevent a finding of any 
liability in negligence.118  As noted in the decision of Cambridge Water: 
 
as a general rule it is more appropriate for strict liability in respect of operations of high 
risks to be imposed by Parliament, than by the courts. If such liability is imposed by 
statute, the relevant activities can be identified, and those concerned can know where they 
stand. Furthermore, statute can where appropriate lay down precise criteria establishing 
the incidence and scope of such liability.119
 
IX THE FUTURE OF TORT-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION 
 
As a regulatory tool, tortious actions for climate harm are expensive and unruly and the 
outcomes are indeterminate.  As commented by Peel ‘the ad hoc nature of court 
proceedings, the expense involved in bringing them, and the uncertainty as to their 
results means that, in the long-term, litigation alone is unlikely to be an optimal 
approach for bringing about effective action to address climate change’.120
 
Given the prevalent uncertainties and weaknesses in tortious actions for climate change, 
the common law is not the most appropriate tool for achieving necessary behavioural 
changes to reduce emissions and avoid climate harms.  In addressing climate change, 
the proper role of the common law should be to act as a complementary measure against 
a background of strong regulatory action.  However, it is highly questionable whether 
the common law can adapt sufficiently to address the current ‘gaps’ in the regulatory 
web.121  
 
International and domestic regulatory frameworks for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions are slowly emerging around the world in an ad hoc fashion.  There is now a 
Federal government proposal in Australia to implement a scheme for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions.122  However, such a scheme would not commence until 2010 
and reductions in emissions would not be instantaneous.  Moreover, all of these 
regulatory schemes currently fail to address issues of liability for climate harm.  
 
It is submitted that the issue of liability in Australia would be best addressed through a 
nationally consistent, clear regulatory framework to allocate liability for risk of harm.  
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122  Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is proposing to implement a national emissions trading scheme by 2010.  
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The creation of clear statutory principles could provide large-scale emitters with some 
level of certainty regarding their future climate risks and legal liabilities.  Potentially, 
some form of compensation fund could also be established through the allocation of a 
proportion of royalties or profits from these industries.  
 
Such legislation could adopt an appropriate test for causation which incorporates the 
precautionary principle and accommodates the prevailing scientific uncertainty.  Such 
regulation requires a balancing of a range of conflicting economic, social and 
environmental priorities of our society, both now and in the future.123  Accordingly, it is 
submitted that such a process more properly resides in the democratic domain of the 
legislator.  
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